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Vista Alegre: The decline of an historical company 
 
 
 
This case describes the events that took place in Vista Alegre during the last two 
decades (1989-2007). This historic Portuguese company is dedicated mainly to the 
manufacture of ‘table art’ products, gaining enormous prestige on national territory due 
to the excellence of its products. However, this prestige was not sufficient to sustain the 
company, as this case shows.   
 Information can be found in this case regarding the strategic decisions made by 
the company based on growth and major investment in ew equipment in order to create 
a truly international group. However, this strategy did not generate the expected 
outcome and even resulted in the group's steep downfall which would end in the 
takeover bid launched by Visabeira at the beginning of 2009.  
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On 19th January, 2009 the Visabeira Group delivered all ocuments requested to 
the CMVM so that the necessary formalities could be completed on a takeover bid 
regarding a Portuguese public company - Vista Alegre Atlantis. 
 
 Bernardo Vasconcellos e Souza, CEO of the Vista Alegre Atlantis (VAA) Group 
was at VAA’s head office when news of the proposal w s received. Contrary to the 
reaction of the majority of the CEOs, who view the company they head as being the 
target of a takeover bid, the manager received the news with pleasure, even showing a 
slight smile. He knew that, given the serious financi l situation of the group, his team 
was in no condition to perform the necessary transformations to make VAA a lucrative 
institution once more. During the previous months, he had sought solutions which could 
make the group viable but, unfortunately, they were not forthcoming. The possibilities 
of his administration finding a way for the future of the group being frustrated, 
Bernardo Vasconcellos e Souza knew that this same future would be at stake in the next 
few months (maybe weeks). If an investor interested in acquiring the Group did not 
appear rapidly, the Group with the historical brand name “Vista Alegre” would have to 
close its doors. 
 The manager still did not know what strategy Visabeira had in mind for VAA. 
Meanwhile there was hope that this operation would give the stimulus needed to make 
the group workable as well as restore the prestige of the time-honoured brand name 
“Vista Alegre”. 
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History of Vista Alegre 
 Bernardo Vasconcellos e Souza knew that the main asset of the VAA Group was 
the brand name of Vista Alegre porcelain. Its origin dates back to 1815 to the hand of 
José Ferreira Pinto Basto who, inspired by the recent industrial upsurge taking place in 
Portugal, started by acquiring a small farm on the outskirts of Aveiro with the intention 
of establishing an industrial project focused on the creation of porcelain. D. João VI (the 
king of Portugal at that time) granted the licence to operate in 1824.  Right from the 
beginning, the entrepreneur resolved to invest both in t e design and the quality of the 
final product, recognising these as the key to success. 
 Pinto Basto’s risk paid off. The 19th century was a period of extraordinary 
prosperity for the company, this fact being intimately linked with the venture in the 
designs put forward by recognised artists of the time (this point still being true today). 
 At the turn of the century, the company’s circumstances worsened considerably 
due to the unstable political clime. This period of stagnation only started to reverse 
during the years from 1947 to 1968 with the acquisition of two important competitive 
companies and the investment in the training of the technical staff. These two changes 
in the bosom of Vista Alegre made a technical and industrial development possible and 
provided the means for an ambitious “attack” on the int rnational market. During the 
70s and 80s the company was a centre for technological development and gave a great 
deal of attention to the training of young painters.  
 However, in spite of various investments during its history, at the end of the 80s 
the company faced a critical situation which demanded a new definition of the 
company’s strategy. 
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The change of strategy 
 The current CEO of Vista Alegre Atlantis was already part of the institution 
(although he performed other functions) when the new aims for the company were 
defined, which once and for all changed the course of the company. He remembers 
exactly the reasons which justified this change.  
 At the end of the 80s, the growth of Vista Alegre slowed each year. This fact, 
associated with the reduced dimension of the Portuguese market, led to the investment 
on the external market. The administration at that ime believed that the best way to 
make an assault on the external markets was to alter the target public of the company, 
that is to say, this internationalization should also include the European and American 
middle and upper middle classes instead of focussing as before on their elite. However, 
in order to follow this plan, it would be necessary to increase the established productive 
capacity. To this end, investments were made during the 90s, but the main leverage was 
the merger with the ceramic group Cerexport in 1997 (Exhibit 1). 
 
Merger with Cerexport 
 Cerexport was a Portuguese ceramic group, smaller than Vista Alegre, with 
international standing. It was believed that the merger of the two groups would 
duplicate the volume of business of the new Vista Alegre as well as gaining a better 
international standing and a greater diversification in its business area. 
The merger with this group experienced a number of major setbacks, which the 
then administration had not foreseen. This caused a significant delay in the integration 
of the two groups. The procedure was devised in 1990 with the objective of creating a 
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group of “European proportions” which would allow a relevant access to the new 
markets in mind. In 1991, it was approved in the general meeting by the majority of 
shareholders, although a small group opposed the procedure, lodging a lawsuit which 
was concluded only in 1997. In this same year, the procedure was finalized, although 
the results were only reflected in the 1998 balance sheet. 
 At the same time as this merger, as from 1991 Vista Alegre made important 
investments in their main industrial unit (in Ílhavo) with the aim of providing it with the 
most advanced technologies of the sector. This investm nt greatly increased the 
productive capacity of this unit making it possible to focus a significant part of the 
production of the two groups (Vista Alegre and Cerexport) in Ílhavo. The then 
administration also believed that this transfer of production of the two groups to a 
single, modernised production centre would generate important combined actions 
giving leverage to the value of the new group resulting from the procedure. This merger 
would also allow Vista Alegre to diversify its activi y within its sector (porcelain) 
especially with the production of earthenware, a business in which it participated via the 
company Capôa – a subsidiary of Cerexport.  
 
Reinforcement of the strategy followed 
 At the turn of the millennium, the group administration considered that the 
efforts made to reach the European dimension (despite generating positive results) had 
not brought about the results hoped for. Thus the Vista Alegre Group prepared a new 
series of important investments with a view to automatizing the Ílhavo unit as well as a 
new merger with another important group of Portuguese tableware – the Atlantis Group 
(Exhibit 1). 
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Merger with Atlantis 
 The bringing of the Vista Alegre Group and the Atlan is Group together (the 
group dedicated to the production of crystal tableware) with a view to integration goes 
back to the 80s. They saw a good partner in each other which could complement not 
only the supply of goods, but also widen the range of the markets that the group was 
open to. This merger would be responsible for the creation of the sixth major player of 
European tableware – an advantage taking into account the objective of 
internationalization. 
 The main source of revenue of the now merged groups had always been the sale 
of tableware sets, especially through a mechanism which was very common in Portugal 
at that time – the “wedding list”: guests gave gifts from the list to the bride and groom. 
It was usual for these lists to include Vista Alegre and Atlantis products and it was quite 
common for Vista Alegre shops to receive over a thousand lists annually. The 
administration of the two groups believed that their union and the way they 
complemented each other (Vista Alegre produced porcelain sets and Atlantis connected 
with crystal produced mainly glassware sets) would lead consumers interested in one of 
the brands to obtain the complementary products of he other group. 
 The diffusion of the two brands on different interational markets was also an 
important strategic point in this merger. Vista Alegr  was well-known on the Spanish 
and German markets and Atlantis in its turn had been successfully introduced to the 
American market. Thus this merger enabled the easy introduction of Vista Alegre sets 
coupled with the Atlantis brand into the American market, thereby completing the offer 
of products for “table art” in this sphere and the other way round in the cases of the 
Spanish and German markets. 
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 The advantages of a merger between the two groups being identified, the 
opportunity to follow this through arises when part of the profit sharing of the two 
groups is in the hands of ordinary shareholders (Cofina and BPI). Thus this operation 
was announced to the market in September, 2000 and w s only concluded in 2001. 
 
Alterations on the market 
 In the middle of the process of integrating the two industrial groups – a process 
that, because of the complexity of the two institutions (mainly Vista Alegre which 
included various companies) would be costly both in terms of capital and time - two 
facts were noted which radically altered the market conditions until then. 
 The first was the terrorist attack on the United States on 11th September, 2001. 
This event shook the world economies causing important changes regarding spending so 
that the consumer limited the acquisition of unnecessary articles demanding a 
substantial investment.  “Table art” articles such as the tableware produced by Vista 
Alegre Atlantis suffered a decrease in demand, givin  as an example the wedding lists, 
the new generation of couples no longer interested in having these kinds of articles on 
their lists. The new families started by having only one set of more functional 
tableware. Events where “table art” was used (ceremonies, receiving guests etc.) took 
place away from home. These articles were now seen as a considerable investment with 
little use in the future. 
 The event prior to this was also marked by the unexpectedly high costs of energy 
and the historical appreciation of the Euro. Knowing that this industry (tableware, 
specifically the “table art”) is controlled by the predominance of two expenses: manual 
labour (being an industry of intensive work in exclusive articles) and energy (the latter 
Vista Alegre: The decline of an historical company 
8 
 
being more pertinent), we understand how critical this period was for the Group. The 
appreciation of the Euro in 2001 was, without doubt, another adversity for the new 
group which was aiming for internationalization. 
 The second relevant fact that occurred during the merger period was the entry of 
China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which facilitated the 
proliferation of her products in Europe and America. This new player produced 
functional tableware at extremely aggressive prices due to a completely different 
method regarding the costs of manual labour. 
 
The decisions during the merger 
 During the year of its creation, the Vista Alegre Atlantis Group faced a series of 
challenges critical for the future of the group. Animportant alteration in the conjuncture 
of the “table art” market and a merger procedure which was meant to be speedy and 
efficient demanded the choice of a strong leader, capable of creating a new institution 
which would prosper in the face of the new market conditions from the union of Vista 
Alegre with Atlantis. 
 Mário Pais de Sousa was the one chosen to head the modernization and 
internationalization process of the Vista Alegre Atlan is Group. Bernardo Vasconcellos 
e Souza remembers why this manager was indicated to head this project. Mário Pais de 
Sousa was, until then, the leader of a company of a company whose capital was well 
established, more specifically Vulcano (a company dedicated to the production of water 
heaters). Here, Mário Pais de Sousa had directed the modernization of the company, 
obtaining very satisfactory results and was thus indicated as a worthy leader in the 
modernization of VAA. 
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 Mário Pais de Sousa’s immediate objective was the modernization of the group’s 
main units with new equipment which, owing to their special characteristics, would 
only be useful for this specific industry. Nevertheless, he hoped to transfer the 
production of the various factories in the group to these modernized units thus reducing 
the fixed costs borne by the company. Thus the following plan was defined for the 
three-year period of 2001 to 2003: 
 Reduction in the number of companies in Portugal from 14 to 3 
 Without loss of production capacity, reduction in the number of 
factories from 12 to 6 
 Reduction in the number of logistics centres from 14 to 6 
 Reduction in the number of employees from 4,300 to 3,080 
 This operational restructure was expected to cost 26 million Euros, the removal 
of factories and warehouses 12.5 million, and 13.5 million for compensation due to the 
laying-off of staff. 
 Above all, it was hoped that this restructuring would give rise to a reduction in 
costs of 26.7 million Euros in 2004 (compared to 2000 – the last year before 
restructuring) of which: 
 17.3 million Euros due to the reduction of employees 
 3.9 million Euros from the reduction of consumption 
 5.5 million Euros originating from the reduction of other costs 
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The verification of failure 
 In 2003, the failure of the strategy became obvious with a loss of almost 30 
million Euros (Exhibit 3). The company had made an enormous financial effort to 
increase productive capacity and efficiency, but unfortunately the hoped-for results did 
not materialize thus worsening the company’s situation. Faced with an extremely 
serious treasury deficit, it was urgent to find a financial solution which would gain some 
time and financial sustainability so that the whole strategy followed by VAA could be 
rethought.  
 The following years were extremely difficult for VAA’s administration. In 2004 
and 2005, the administration tried to eliminate costs as much as possible, investing only 
in that considered indispensable. However, the most unpleasant task was selecting 
personnel of the group to be made redundant since the group’s results were inferior to 
its obligations. It was necessary to find an extraordinary monetary flow, thus, Cerisol, 
95% of Crisal and VA Brazil were sold during this period.  It was clear to the 
administrators that these decisions resolved none of the group’s problems, serving only 
to lessen the size of the annual negative results (Exhibit 3), taking advantage of the 
group’s various activities to prolong its existence until a real solution could be found.    
 
Financial restructuring 2006 
 VAA’s CEO was seriously worried with the group’s present situation. The 
investments made previously had not produced the desired results, but had rather 
aggravated the financial health of the company. VAA urgently needed to obtain funds to 
carry out an economic restructuring to make the group workable. In this context, 
Bernardo Vasconcellos e Souza held a meeting with VAA’s main creditors, BCP, BPI 
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and CGD banks, with the expectation of reaching an agreement to lighten the burden of 
the debt and at the same time bestow on the group the financial capacity to carry out the 
economic restructuring already mentioned. 
 The meeting proved to be a life-giving breath of air for VAA. Through the 
concession of new guarantees on the group’s assets and the conversion of 50 million 
Euros credit from the banks mentioned before in equity (Exhibit 5), the group managed 
to restructure all its bank liabilities, the main benefits gained being: 
• The obligation to withdraw the executive shares interposed by the 
aforementioned banks to VAA; 
• A staggering of the debt over 10 years; 
• Reduction of the applicable interest rate. 
 Knowing that this agreement would not resolve the group’s situation structurally 
and permanently, the CEO was happy with the result as it would give more time for 
VAA to reverse its position at that period. 
 
European peers: What is the situation? 
 Bernardo Vasconcellos e Souza knew that the alterations taking place during the 
present decade, both at the level of consumer tastes and the introduction of strong 
competition from the East into Europe, placed Vista Alegre Atlantis and its European 
peers in a very critical situation. So as to face important future challenges, two formulae 
were used by the European companies producing high quality porcelain (and crystal).   
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 One was a wager on the growth of productive capacity and the acquisition of 
brands in the sector (Vista Alegre and Waterford Wedgwood), having the intention of 
taking advantage of the world-famous trademarks andreducing the unit costs of 
production. And a second strategy, completely the opposite of the other, aimed at 
focussing on market niches, especially the hotel business (BHS Tabletop, Churchill 
China). 
 
Waterford Wedgwood 
 This Irish company of tableware in porcelain and crystal has a similar past to 
that of Vista Alegre. Waterford Wedgwood (WW) determined the best strategy to face 
the market changes was growth by way of acquiring companies in the same sector, 
having an excellent reputation with consumers, but in complicated economic situations. 
The company believed that these acquisitions would he p with important investments in 
new technologies, bestowing WW with a dimension and productive structure capable of 
producing an output at competitive prices and with the Premium quality of always.  The 
importance of upsizing and the acquisition of reputable brands were closely linked with 
the investments in new production technologies since the advantages (reduction of 
output costs) would only be realized if the new equipment worked at full capacity, 
which would have been impossible to achieve working o ly with the primitive WW. It 
was within this context that the German Rosenthal (1997) and the British Royal Doulton 
(2004) were acquired.  
 Obviously this strategy meant that there could be no slowing down of consumer 
demand in all sectors of Premium tableware, especially that of families (always the 
most significant customer for these types of product). However, this premise was not 
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realized, as household consumption became more and more focussed on much cheaper 
and inferior quality tableware, basically from Asia. The strategy defined by WW 
therefore resulted in an enormous fiasco. On the on hand, the heavy investments 
undertaken were insufficient to equal the competitive prices of the Asian industry, and 
on the other hand the acquisitions worsened the already fragile financial situation of 
WW even more. 
 The company’s results were deteriorating as well as its financial sustainability. 
In August 2008, in a desperate effort not to go under, the management team declared 
that new shares would be issued with a value of 120 million Euros. This increase in 
capital was unsuccessful, the company being unable to find investors interested in this 
operation. At the same time, the financial health of the company made it impossible to 
obtain any funds from banking institutions. 
 Without solutions to make the company viable, the predictable road to 
bankruptcy was rapid. After WW’s shares reached 0.001 euros in October, 2008, and 
after unsuccessfully finding a possible buyer for the company, it was declared insolvent 
in the first days of 2009. In March the same year, the American KPS Capital Partners 
agreed to acquire part of WW (the agreement managed through Deloitte), immediately 
announcing the company would be the target of a profound restructuring, completely 
altering the previous strategy and dimension of the company. 
 
BHS Tabletop 
 Still in the 90s, the transfer of the household tableware division to Rosenthal 
(subsidiary of WW) by the German BHS Tabletop showed how the strategy of this 
company was the opposite of that of WW and VAA. Prepa ing for the launch of Asiatic 
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products on the European market, with costs that would not be possible to compete 
with, and realizing that household preferences were more and more centred on cheap 
utility tableware which did not correspond with itsrange of products, BHS Tabletop 
opted to prematurely abandon a branch of business identified as destroyer of value in 
the short and medium term (household tableware) and focussing on the sale of articles 
aimed at the Horeca channel (Hotel/restaurant/Caterer). 
 This strategy diminished the dimension of the company as well as its volume. 
However, this focus and specialisation enabled BHS Tabletop to have an excellent 
performance with Horeca - a niche in the market where the quality and excellence of 
Premium tableware was still the vital point in the decision to buy tableware items. Thus, 
this German company has managed to present positive results in these last few years. 
 
Churchill China 
 The British Churchill China opted for a strategy very similar to that of BHS 
Tabletop, but with a less radical approach, since it opted to reduce the capacity of its 
division destined for household tableware rather than get rid of it. Just like its German 
peer, Churchill China focused on the Horeca channel wh re, in 2009, it is the leader of 
the United Kingdom market and is also present in Europe and the United States. The 
option to specialize in this division was to take adv ntage of the fact that Horeca 
continues to acquire Premium tableware due to the preference for quality, the price 
being a variable secondary decision. Nowadays, this English company shows solid 
results - an outstanding fact in a sector facing such strong competition from the East. 
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What’s VAA’s new direction? 
 It is in an adverse context that VAA’s CEO has received Visabeira’s proposal. 
The financial restructuring undertaken in 2006 prevented the historic Portuguese brand 
from immediate failure, although it did not generat  financial flow, which could make 
the redefinition of a new strategy for the group viable. Until then, the company had run 
a difficult course in which the objective had been to survive as long as possible until 
another solution for the group appeared. This period was characterized by the loss of 
assets and reduced investments. 
 It was with a mixture of satisfaction and discretion, characteristic of someone 
who knows the sector well, that Bernardo Vasconcellos e Souza received the news of 
the interest shown by Visabeira. He was worried that Visabeira did not have the 
capacity to absorb an institution avid for cash-flows like VAA, with more than a 
thousand employees and with an urgent need for capital both to resolve its immediate 
financial problems and to find a new strategy. Finally, profusion of functional Chinese 
tableware entering the European market at very competitive prices representing 70% of 
tableware consumed in Europe at the same time as the Visabeira proposal, caused 
anxiety that any strategy defined by the Viseu group would be insufficient faced with 
the pressure from such a competitor. 
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Exhibit 1  Vista Alegre - Consolidated Balance 1989-2007 (basic form) 
(€ in 000) 
 
 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 19981 1999 2000 20012 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
                    Intangible Fixed Assets 11 7 1,108 12,828 12,866 14,129 13,640 13,702 14,735 44,697 44,310 46,190 5,737 5,545 7,437 7,286 9,511 9,325 7,534 
Tangible Fixed Assets 1,633 2,326 13,471 23,262 24,171 24,339 22,795 22,100 23,386 43,759 46,550 44,821 116,025 109,447 111,688 78,351 60,279 56,401 68,909 
Financial Assets 1,275 1,558 17,249 145 134 154 171 169 168 5,573 709 6,363 14,259 13,315 8,793 31,042 494 449 266 
Inventory 4,339 5,027 5,812 12,897 13,541 13,152 14,287 15,15 11,793 24,099 28,484 31,549 41,570 49,717 47,058 30,897 48,056 42,735 22,496 
Receivables 5,306 3,267 7,445 6,602 7,597 8,530 8,639 9,475 13,783 20,903 22,950 22,087 39,524 39,386 39,291 20,756 23,653 16,033 14,374 
Cash 127 145 46 448 1,897 1,444 256 349 581 5,889 2,251 721 1,920 1,833 438 1,338 325 426 239 
Accruals and Deferrals 1,375 1,868 427 91 192 265 235 311 550 1,614 2,716 2,280 16,267 18,734 28,329 28,655 20,874 12,354 5,222 
Total Assets 14,065 14,197 45,558 56,273 60,397 62,012 60,023 61,25  64,995 146,534 147,970 154,011 235,301 237,978 243,034 198,324 163,192 137,723 119,040 
 
                   
Total Shareholders´s Equity 5,792 6,385 31,214 30,906 31,964 32,993 33,473 36,057 27,351 57,822 49,180 49,171 54,945 47,135 24,010 6,826 -15,058 4,975 -10,501 
 
                   
Long Term Liabilities 2,453 1,785 3,439 8,632 11,108 10,259 7,679 8,262 7,952 29,075 31,115 19,400 47,812 44,605 35,008 38,498 23,598 66,883 88,226 
Short Term Liabilities 5,820 4,858 9,150 11,861 12,436 14,073 14,506 12,999 20,257 53,083 60,952 79,147 111,451 127,174 164,34 138,457 132,061 45,718 29,923 
Accruals and Defferals 0 1,169 1,754 4,874 4,890 4,688 4,365 3,938 9,436 6,374 6,723 6,293 21,094 19,064 19,702 14,543 22,591 20,147 11,390 
Total Liabilities 8,273 7,812 14,343 25,367 28,434 29,019 26,550 25,199 37,645 88,532 98,790 104,839 180,357 190,843 219,0 3 191,498 178,250 132,748 129,539 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Merger with Cerexport 
2 Merger with Atlantis 
Source: Vista Alegre Annual Reports 
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Exhibit 2 Vista Alegre - Income Statement 1989-2007 (basic form) 
(€ in 000 000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3
 Economic Restructuring  
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20033 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Sales 13.96 15.08 31.12 32.85 33.99 39.90 42.95 45.63 49.78 82.83 85.21 88.74 141.3 146.9 136.9 92.9 79 75.5 68.1 
Gross Margin 7.63 8.74 17.74 20.17 20.40 22.66 24.57 27.48 17.85 30.29 32.26 35.43 16.1 20.7 125.6 64.7 56.8 54.9 48.5 
      Depreciation 0.83 0.84 3.42 3.99 3.86 3.90 4.26 4.11 4.61 7.31 6.53 7.24 16.7 20.1 20.4 14 10.2 9.1 7.7 
Operating Results 2.01 2.24 2.86 3.96 2.56 4.28 5.12 6.64 2.63 7.39 12.28 5.36 -0.6 0.6 -16.6 -15.1 -13.2 -11.9 -7.1 
EBT 1.14 1.36 0.27 0.11 -0.68 1.35 2.60 5.06 0.99 4.69 -1.76 0.75 -7.6 -0.9 -38.5 -20.4 -20.9 -16.5 -11.6 
Net Income 0.96 1.11 0.04 -0.13 -0.96 0.86 1.40 2.94 1.41 5.92 -2.35 0.17 0.6 -0.6 -29.4 -13.5 -18.3 -13.7 -12.4 
Source: Vista Alegre Annual Reports 
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Exhibit 3 Vista Alegre - Net Income 1989-2007  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 4 Vista Alegre – Stock Price Evolution 
  (in €)  
 
 
  
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Net Income 963 1,112 45 -135 -958 858 1,402 2,938 1,407 5,916 -2,35 175 600 -600 -29,4 -13,5 -18,3 -13,7 -12,4
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Exhibit 5     Vista Alegre - Financial Restructuring 2006 
 
On 3/2/2006, as divulged on the CMVM information system, the Company and 
its affiliates, with the Banks, creditors of the Vista Alegre Atlantis, signed a series of 
contracts with a view to the financial restructuring of the Group, complying with the 
following general principals: 
 a)  the debt to be restructured includes all of Group VAA’s bank liabilities and 
others; 
 b)  the Bank creditors are obliged to forego the ex cutive actions proposed 
against associates of the VAA Group and organize the  consequent cancellation of the 
seizures registered and decreed  within the context; 
 c)  staggering of the debt over 10 years; 
 d)  30-month period of grace for the reimbursement of capital; 
 e)  reduction in the applicable interest rate; 
 f)  reinforcement of Bank guarantees through the establishment of  a pledge 
regarding brand names, industrial equipment and leasing of commercial establishments 
and mortgages on property;    
 g)  approval of the following deliberations by the General Meeting of VAA-
Vista Alegre Atlantis, SGPS, SA: 
g.1)  reduction of the Company’s share capital and the use of reserves to cover 
losses carried forward from the date of the last approved annual balance sheet;  
g.2)  conversion of credits to the global amount of fifty million Euros in own 
capital through the issue of new ordinary shares and the establishment of fringe  
benefits subject to the regime of supplementary benefits underwritten by Banco 
Comercial Português, SA, Banco BPI, SA and Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA;  
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Exhibit 5 (continued)    Vista Alegre - Financial Restructuring 2006 
 
h)  the effectiveness of a substantial part of the contracts remained subject to the 
verification of  certain conditions, mainly the approval by the shareholders’ General 
Meeting of the acts referred to in the previous paragraph. 
 The intercalary shareholders’ General Meeting refer d to in point g) above, 
took place on 10/3/2006 and made the following decisions which, the public notary 
being present, were presented for registration at the Lisbon Company Registration 
Office on the same day (10/3/2006). 
 a) loss coverage to the amount of  24,095,092.00 Euros via the direct use of 
reserves to the amount of 24,095,092.00 Euros (premiums from the issue of shares 
19,258,254.00 Euros; revaluation reserve of 845,293.00 Euros; legal reserves of 
3,112,000.00 Euros and other reserves of 879,545.00 Euros). These reserves were duly 
identified on the Balance sheet, reported on 31st. December, 2004, and approved by the 
shareholders at the General Meeting which took place on 30th June, 2005; 
 b) reduction of the capital shares of the Company from 53,954,745.00 Euros to 
17,189,651.00 Euros, this reduction to the amount of 36,765,094.00 Euros destined 
exclusively to the loss coverage, to be effected through the extinction of 36,765,094.00 
shares, each with a nominal value of one euro; 
 c) alteration of Article Five of the Company’s Articles of Incorporation, the new 
wording being: “The company’s capital, fully subscribed and paid, is 17,189,651 Euros, 
represented by 17,189,651 shares with a nominal value of one euro each”; 
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Exhibit 5 (continued)    Vista Alegre - Financial Restructuring 2006 
 
d) alteration of the nominal value of each share of the company’s capital to the 
nominal unit value of 20 Euro cents each and subsequent change to the nominal value of 
the shares, the capital being divided into 85,948,255 shares with a nominal unit value of 
20 Euro cents each; 
 e) for each share held by the Shareholders before the General Meeting’s 
deliberations, now hold 1.592969349; 
 f) alteration of Article Five of the Company’s Articles of Incorporation, the new 
wording being: “The company’s capital, fully subscribed and paid, is 17,189,651 Euros, 
represented by 85,948,255 shares with a nominal value of 20 Euro cents each”. 
 As a result of the Financial Restructuring Contract nd the intercalary General 
Meeting mentioned before, the Annual General Meeting which took place on 31/5/2006, 
made the following decisions, among others; 
 a) Approval of an increase in capital from €17,189,651 to €29,007,998, fully 
subscribed by the banks Caixa Geral de Depósitos SA, Banco BPI SA and Banco 
Comercial Português SA, the increase of €11,818,347 being via the conversion of 
credits into capital.  
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Exhibit 6 Vista Alegre - Consolidated Balance Sheet (2006 and 2007) 
(€ in 000) 
 
 2007 2006 
Assets 
Non Current Assets: 
  
     Tangible fixed assets      50.836 56.401 
     Fixed Assets investments 18.073 20.206 
     Intangible fixed assets 7.534 9.325 
     Financial assets 266 449 
     Deferred tax assets 5.222 7.088 
          Total Non Current Assets 81.931 93.469 
Current Assets:   
     Inventory 22.496 24.319 
     Receivables 13.330 14.281 
     Advances to suppliers 786 1.229 
     State and other public entities  258 524 
     Cash 239 426 
           Total Current Assets 37.108 40.779 
           Total Assets 119.039 134.248 
 
Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity 
  
Shareholders’ Equity:       
    Share capital 29.008 29.008 
    Supplementary capital  38.182 38.182 
    Treasury stocks -2 -2 
    Reserves and retained earnings -65.422 -51.391 
    Net income of the year -12.367 -14.878 
    Minority interest 101 107 
  
           Total Shareholders’ Equity -10.501 1.026 
Non Current Liabilities:   
     Long-term debt 80.025 57.972 
     Deferred tax 8.201 9.385 
           Total Non Current Liabilities 88.226 67.357 
Current Liabilities:   
     Amounts owed to banks 14.153 32.492 
     Suppliers 12.797 13.226 
     Other creditors 11.017 16.102 
     State and other public entities 2.973 3.517 
     Deferred income 373 528 
           Total Current Liabilities 41.313 65.865 
           Total Liabilities 129.540 133.222 
           Total Liabilities and Shareholder´s Equity 119.039 134.248 
 
 
 
Source: Vista Alegre Annual Reports 
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Exhibit 7 Vista Alegre - Income Statement (2006 and 2007)  
(€ in 000) 
 
 
 
 2007 2006 
Sales and services rendered 68.324 75.961 
Cost of goods sold and materials consumed -19.616 -20.580 
Variation in production -230 -503 
    Gross Margin 48.479 54.878 
Supplies and Services -15.794 -18.940 
Staff costs -30.992 -33.410 
Depreciation -7.671 -9.070 
Adjustments -3.196 -3.051 
Other operating costs and losses -4.103 -6.516 
Operating income and gains 6.200 4.339 
    Operating Profit -7.077 -11.469 
   
Financial profit -4.538 -4.538 
    Pre-tax Profit -11.615 -16.052 
   
Corporation taxes -752 1.174 
   Profit after taxes -12.367 -14.878 
   
Minority interests   
   Net Income -12.367 -14.878 
   Earnings per share (€) -0,085 -0,103 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vista Alegre Annual Reports 
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Exhibit 8  Visabeira Group 
 
 With head office in Viseu, this is a group which began operating in the field of 
telecommunication infrastructures in 1980. Recognized as a high-powered group, it 
rapidly widened operations to different areas, today comprised of five dozen companies 
structured in five sub-holdings: Visabeira Telecommunicações e Construção, Visabeira 
Indústria, Visabeira Imobiliária, Visabeira Turismo and Visabeira Serviços.  
 Diversification for this group is not limited to the productive sectors but also to 
the diversity of the cross-border markets to conquer. Its products are available in forty 
countries, especially Mozambique, Angola, Spain, France, the United Arab Emirates, 
Morocco and Algeria. 
 Based on an initially stable financial situation, there was a 14% growth in the 
2006/2007 dealings, reaching 342.9 million Euros in 2007 (the historical 
telecommunications and construction sectors being mainly responsible for this 
appreciation, corresponding to 82%). The group decided to go ahead with a Public Bid 
of Vista Alegre Atlantis Group through its subsidiary Cerutil. This strategy was aimed 
at giving more weight to the group’s industrial sector so as to reach a better balance 
between the different sectors. If the proposal achieves success, it is calculated that the 
Visabeira Industry could reach a weight of 25% in relation to the global position of the 
group. 
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Exhibit 8 (continued)  Visabeira Group 
 
Visabeira Group’s venture in the ceramic sector became patent with the 
acquisition of the Faianças Artisticas Bordalo Pinhe ro factory on 31st March, 2009. 
Bordalo Pinheiro is also a historic national company, very well-known in Portuguese 
territory, going through a very difficult situation. It was expected to close its doors 
before the acquisition was realized. The announcement of the operation was made with 
the presence of important government members (among them Prime Minister José 
Sócrates and the Minister for the Economy Manuel Pinho) who congratulated 
Visabeira’s managers for having gone ahead with this operation. 
 The connection of the government with this group established in Viseu, is not 
limited to the time of the announcement. Although indirect, the state has important 
capital invested in Visabeira, as the Caixa Geral de Depósitos (a state bank) and Aicep 
(a public company with capital risk) holds 19.5% and 5.94% respectively in Visabeira. 
It is also foreseen that Aicep will participate with 5 million Euros in VAA’s capital it 
the takeover is successful. 
 With the acquisition of VAA, Visabeira will count on two traditional and 
prestigious assets, one of them - Vista Alegre Atlantis - having with an interesting 
international exposure. The excellent reputation of the group can thus be increased. 
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Synopsis 
This case describes the events that took place in Vista Alegre during the last two 
decades (1989-2007). This historic Portuguese company is dedicated mainly to the 
manufacture of ‘table art’ products, gaining enormous prestige on national territory due 
to the excellence of its products. However, as thisca e shows, this prestige was not 
sufficient to sustain the company.   
 Information can be found in this case regarding the strategic decisions made by 
the company based on growth and major investment in ew equipment in order to create 
a truly international group. Nevertheless, the strategy did not generate the expected 
outcome and even resulted in the group's steep decline which would end in the takeover 
bid launched by Visabeira at the beginning of 2009.  
 
Teaching Objectives 
This case can be used in an introductory subject on Financial Statements 
Analysis or on Mergers, Acquisitions and Financial Restructurings. With this case, 
students can interpret the evolution of a company’s ratios, identifying when and how 
such evolution is worrying, or not, for the company’s sustainability. At the same time, 
students will be able to see how a wrong assessment of the advantages of a merger can 
lead to destruction in value. Lastly, the case also sh ws the role the government may 
play in redeeming companies that are considered of importance on a national level.  
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Proposed Questions  
 
1. Vista Alegre Atlantis faced a delicate situation at the end of 2007. Please analyse 
the group´s evolution during the period from 1989 to 2007 with regard to its 
solvability and operational evolution. 
2. In 2001, at the time of the merger with Atlantis, was the group´s speculation to 
expand its manufacturing capacity the best option? Was this strategy in line with 
the group’s European peers? 
3. As well as the growth strategy, another objective of the mergers with Cerexport 
and Atlantis was a greater diversification in terms of business areas so as to 
reduce the company´s exposure to risk. Do you agree that this strategy benefits 
VAA shareholders? 
4. Was Mário Pais de Sousa a good option? What is your opinion based on? 
5. Did the financial restructuring in 2006 generate thdesired results? How did 
VAA’s financial health change following this operation?  
6. Following the financial restructuring of the group, are the new influential 
shareholders ideal to operate the necessary economic restructure? 
7. In your opinion, what was the key point that led to VAA’s present situation? 
What should have been done? 
8. What was the government’s role in the takeover bid launched by Visabeira? 
Would it be plausible to believe that this proposal would be put forward without 
government support? 
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Vista Alegre Atlantis faced a delicate situation at the end of 2007. Please 
analyse the group’s evolution during the period from 1989 to 2007 with regard to 
its solvability and operational evolution.   
 The analysis of any company's ratios and financial information is based on the 
comparison of such values with their historical performance or with their peers' 
performance. This method is widely used in assessing companies and identifying their 
strong points, as well as their critical points. However, if the data are not interpreted 
carefully, one may reach wrong conclusions on the evolution of the group’s 
performance. For example, Vista Alegre carried out two mergers during the period 
analysed (Cerexport in 1998, and Atlantis in 2001), and so it is foreseeable that there is 
an increase in its tangible fixed assets during these periods which is basically the result 
of the consolidation of the balance sheets and not because of investments in this type of 
assets during those periods.  
With regard to this matter, we shall compare VAA's current ratios with its own 
ratios in past years, and by looking at the differences, we shall try to understand how the 
group evolved in the last two decades and what the changes and decisions were that led 
to the group’s present situation.  
 What is Vista Alegre Atlantis’s present situation? 
 A simple analysis of VAA’s last balance sheet (2007) is enough for us to 
understand how serious the group’s situation is. Its Owner´s Equity is negative and 
consequently, the level of debt is clearly exaggerated, thus the group’s liabilities are 
higher than its Assets, which obviously means the company is practically breaking up. 
As from 2002, VAA has continuously shown negative net i come which has diluted the 
group’s equity to the point that they are negative.  
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   It is clear that VAA’s situation is very serious and gives a picture of imminent 
bankruptcy and it is important to understand what originated this situation; was it an 
operational or a financial problem? And what mistakes did the VAA administrators 
make when deciding on the best strategy for the group?   
 Operating Performance 
 The Gross Profit Margin (GPM) and the Operating Profit Margin (OPM) are two 
ratios that enable us to understand how the operational performance of a company 
varied. The GPM provides us with the impact of direct costs with the production of the 
goods sold; and the OPM gives us the impact other operational costs (where 
depreciations and salaries are evident) have on that same margin. Like most ratios, the 
GPM and the OPM vary enormously depending on each industry’s characteristics, and 
so there are no standard values that allow us to immediately say whether the values 
given are favourable to the group or not. The historical characteristics of the Vista 
Alegre products – high quality and some are even exclusive – meant the group was able 
to obtain a relatively high GPM, but at the same time such quality/exclusivity demanded 
a strong work force which greatly penalized the Operating Profit Margin in relation to 
the Gross Profit Margin because of the weight of the salaries. VAA’s administration 
saw this gap as being too detrimental to the group’s results. Investment in new 
production technologies was seen as a priority, as w s the group’s growth by merging 
with Cerexport and Atlantis. Because of its productive capacity, this growth would be 
integrated in the group’s internationalization strategy. 
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Chart 1 
  
Chart 1 shows how damaging this strategy was to VAA. Despite the GPM’s 
visible growth in 2003, stabilizing at around 70% in the following years, we can see that 
the OPM became negative in that same period and did not change over the following 
years. We can also see how the group's results were penalized during this period, having 
even reached a loss of 30 million Euros in 2003.     
Upon making a deeper analysis, we can see that following a relatively stable 
period for the GPM with values of approximately 60%, the group’s GPM decreased 
considerably which in itself is not a negative indicator as we know that the company 
had speculated on growth and therefore the exclusivity of its products had been reduced 
considerably and consumers were not willing to pay such a high price for these products 
as they had done before because they had lost their status. However, in order for this 
loss of margin not to be a bad result, sales would have to increase significantly changing 
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a group that previously operated with high margins into a group whose operations are 
based on a high volume of sales. But this was not the case. The group sales only 
increased considerably in 1998 and 2001 – years that cannot be directly compared to 
other years because this growth is the result of the mergers with Cerexport and Atlantis, 
and not because of an endogenous growth in sales.  
The GPM’s extraordinary growth in 2003 was the result of the group's economic 
restructuring, having closed half of its factories and concentrating its production on the 
remaining units. In counterpoint to this rise, VAA’s sales have continued to fall since 
2003 and the operational results have not been positive nce, considering the weight of 
compensations paid to workers after the various factories closed, but especially because 
the group found it impossible to work at maximum capacity, thereby decreasing the 
fixed costs (namely salaries).  
The strategy defined by VAA failed because of a badassessment of its products’ 
comparative advantages based on high quality. The growth became too much to 
continue to produce unique items, and in the same way could not have competitive 
production costs (especially after China adhered to WTO) in the production of 
tableware. Thus, in this decade, Vista Alegre Atlantis became a group of high 
productive capacity but, unable to deal with this, it became one of its main problems.    
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Financial Performance 
 
 
Chart 2 
 
 
VAA’s financial performance had three key events – the two mergers and the 
financial restructuring in 2006. The most relevant situation chart 2 is probably the fact 
that the group’s Equity reached negative figures in 2005 and 2007, which in itself is a 
situation of technical bankruptcy. Adding to this serious structural imbalance is the 
major increase in the group’s liabilities, especially the short-term liabilities which 
suffered an exponential growth between 1997 and 2003. The fact that the short-term 
liabilities were approximately 4 times higher than the long-term liabilities, foresees 
even more a scenario of imminent collapse for VAA, as most of its responsibilities 
would have to be dealt with immediately. Facing a serious structural imbalance in 2005, 
with liabilities of 178 million Euros and negative owner´s equity of 15 million Euros, 
the administration decided to carry out a financial restructuring in 2006 based on 
reconverting part of the short-term liabilities into equity and into long-term liabilities. 
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The main impact of this restructuring was the inversion of the structure of the group’s 
liabilities, which made the long-term liabilities more predominant. On the other hand, 
the positive effect on equity was brief and only lasted during 2006. A final note: to 
alienate the tangible fixed assets between 2004 and 2005 so as to reduce the short-term 
liabilities thus honouring their financial commitments showed once more that the 
group's situation was extremely serious and that it was necessary to obtain this sort of 
extraordinary revenue so as to comply with its obligations.   
A more detailed analysis shows that when financial leverage is correctly 
managed it is a way of increasing shareholders’ profitability by deducting the tax from 
the cost of the debt. However, we must take into account that, contrary to financing via 
equity, the main debt must be amortized including the interest rate defined in the 
contract. Should these obligations not be complied with, the company incurs financial 
problems. Therefore, the greater a company’s leverage, the greater its likelihood of 
facing financial problems in the future and will have more interest to pay by 
downgrading its credit. So, to make it easier to study the evolution of VAA’s financial 
leverage, I have calculated the Debt to Assets ratio. 
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Chart 3 
  
VAA increased its leverage in such a way that, in 10 years, it changed from 
being a company financed by equal liabilities and equity to a company with a negative 
equity (which, as we have seen, is considered bankruptcy). Considering this scenario, it 
is obvious that VAA's administration did not manage its exposure to the risk of over-
indebtedness correctly. Avoiding the present capital structure would have been 
fundamental because the present structure is so seri u  that it reduces the group's 
chances of survival and of finding a major investor interested in buying VAA. Although 
the merger with Cerexport (1998) is accepted as having taken into account the group's 
capital structure at the time, having a low stable financial leverage from 1991 to 1997 
compared to the other years under analysis, the same is not the case with the merger 
with Atlantis and with later investment plans. In fact, in 2001 (year in which the merger 
with Atlantis took place) Vista Alegre’s leverage was already taking on worrying 
proportions (especially considering the effect of the low growth in the last few years) 
and going ahead with an operation and investment plan that would demand major 
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investment would be careless, to say the least, especially considering that at the time the 
interest supported by VAA would increase more and more because of the greater risk of 
non-compliance towards its creditors. The financial restructure of 2006 which made the 
groups' main creditors its shareholders by converting heir credits into shares, did not 
solve the group's exposure to risk, showing that this had become a permanent problem 
for VAA.  
The Solvency Ratio indicates the capacity a company has of complying with its 
future obligations. This ratio will depend on the institution's capacity to create wealth 
and the group's level of indebtedness. This is how it is normally calculated:  
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Chart 4 
 
Stressing what I stated before, Vista Alegre suffered a continuous downfall in 
the last 10 years. This increasing difficulty in being able to comply with its obligations 
does not have a single origin. As the previous analysis showed, both the group's 
operational performance and its increased indebtedness made very complicated 
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advances for VAA’s solvability. It becomes clear that the company was in an imminent 
and inevitable state of rupture when after 2004 it could no longer create value from its 
activity (depreciations + net income < 0).  
Although it is clear that the company’s problem is a tructural and permanent 
one, and not a liquidity problem, it is interesting to see how the company performed in 
this field.  
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Chart 5 
 
 The company also faced various problems from a liquid ty point of view, 
including the merger with Cerexport which made the working capital negative, and all 
the difficulties associated with non-compliance with s creditors. In this case, the 
financial restructuring was decisive in inverting the setting, providing VAA with the 
liquidity needed to comply with its short-term obligations. This restructuring had 
immediate effects on VAA’s liquidity, producing positive results in 2006 with its 
Current Ratio once more above 1. This meant that short-term liabilities were once more 
lower than the short-term assets. Although this did not solve all of the group's problems, 
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the company was given the chance to survive until a alternative solution was found. 
Considering the current scenario, such a solution would only be possible with a 
takeover bid on VAA.  
   
To conclude, Vista Alegre Atlantis’s current downfall is structural and 
impossible to reverse considering the company’s current conditions. At the moment, the 
group is not capable of granting any kind of return to its shareholders for the capital 
invested in the group, and is not even capable of producing positive operational results, 
with the added fact that its current capacity of indebtedness is null. The investment in 
the group’s growth was a failure, the company lost its capacity to produce high added-
value items, and it was not capable of positioning itself on the market as a major 
international producer so as to create value from the volume of sales. From a financial 
point of view, the group levered itself too much, becoming too exposed to the risk of 
falling into non-compliance. Despite having solved a serious liquidity problem through 
the financial restructuring in 2006, the group’s struc ural problems remained unaltered 
following this financial engineering. Following the merger with Cerexport (the first step 
in the growth strategy) which immediately gave negative signs via the general decrease 
in the group’s ratios, Vista Alegre’s administration should have reconsidered whether 
the operation with Atlantis was in fact a good move, especially considering that due to 
its dimension, such operation would demand an important financial effort in integrating 
both groups at a time when Vista Alegre was already showing signs of excessive 
leverage.       
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In 2001, at the time of the merger with Atlantis, was the group’s speculation 
to expand its manufacturing capacity the best option? Was this strategy in line 
with the group’s European peers?    
 Evidence shows that it was unlikely that this was a good strategy. The aim of the 
defined plan had been to increase the group’s growth and productive capacity so as to 
reduce the production costs per item and have a better chance of entering international 
markets. These ambitions faced two important obstacles: the fall in the demand for 
‘table art’ products (which was becoming steeper as of the end of the 80s), and 
especially with China becoming a member of the World Trade Organization, which 
made it impossible for the competition strategy based on price to be successful, because 
it was difficult to compete with the Chinese. With a technologically advanced 
productive structure with which the company could produce more items at a lower price 
per unit, VAA had never been able to make any profit from its investment because sales 
did not follow a line parallel to the increase in its productive capacity. Thus, the new 
equipment brought no benefits. 
 VAA’s strategy was very similar to the strategy followed by Waterford 
Wedgwood. This Irish group had also put their hope n a growth strategy in order to 
face the new Millennium by carrying out several mergers and making purchases, and 
also made a stated investment in new production equipment and technology. However, 
this strategy was based on a presupposition that contradicted the trend of the last few 
years – there was no decrease in the familial consumption of high quality tableware. 
These investments did not produce the desired outcome and led to the group’s 
progressive downfall.   
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 BHS Tabletop and Churchill China’s strategies contradicted those taken by 
VAA and WW. When faced by families’ increasingly evident diminishing consumption 
of these products, these companies decided to reduce their productive structure and 
focused on the production of greater added-value products aimed at consumers whose 
demand remained stable (Horeca channel), as opposed t  families. This strategy kept 
BHS Tabletop and Churchill China far too dependent on the evolution of the Horeca 
channel in terms of consumption. However, it did originate immediate positive results at 
the same time that their smaller size meant that they were much more flexible to deal 
with market changes. 
 VAA’s hopes of becoming larger and increasing its productive capacity at a time 
when China positioned itself as a new player on the market, which at the same time was 
giving signs of contraction, does not seem to be a strategy that would bring any value to 
the company. Faced with these new challenges, VAA should have clearly bet on its 
advantages (the excellence of its products and the prestige of its brand name), and 
should have thus worked on the high margins obtained and not on the amounts sold, and 
maybe reduce its productive capacity considering the market contraction. By taking into 
account the bets made by its European peers and their results, this strategy would have 
ensured better results. 
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As well as the growth strategy, another objective of the mergers with 
Cerexport and Atlantis was a greater diversification in terms of business areas so 
as to reduce the company’s exposure to risk. Do you agree that this strategy 
benefits VAA shareholders? 
This justification for the mergers is hardly convincing. The first point we should 
take into account is that diversification in itself does not produce value; the advantage of 
diversification results from reducing the variation in the group’s returns, thus reducing 
the risk the group faces because of such variation. H wever, not every company’s return 
variation may be diversified, only non-systemic variation (which results from the 
specific nature of each business) can be reduced throug  diversification; this is not the 
case with systemic risk (which is common to all busine ses). Despite realizing that 
diversifications may be somewhat limited in terms of use, it is undoubtedly useful in 
reducing the risks faced by shareholders regarding their return variation.  
However, it is unlikely that diversification by the company cannot be made by 
shareholders with the same results and fewer expenses, considering that shareholders 
can more easily be diversified than companies by purchasing shares from various 
companies. In the specific case of VAA, Cerexport and Atlantis were privately held 
companies and so Vista Alegre shareholders could not diversify by purchasing their 
own shares. Regardless of this, once more it would be unlikely that they could not 
diversify, reducing their exposure to Vista Alegre’s non-systemic risk by purchasing 
shares from other companies, obtaining the same (or better) results than the mergers 
obtained by diversifying their shareholders.    
To conclude, Vista Alegre’s diversification would only be beneficial for its 
shareholders if it meant fewer expenses than diversification carried out by the 
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shareholders themselves. This is unlikely though because shareholders can obtain the 
same diversification in a cheaper and more flexible manner by simply buying shares 
from other companies.  
 
Was Mário Pais de Sousa a good option? What is your opinion based on? 
At a critical time for the group, which was facing several risk situations all at the 
same time (a merger which would have a major impact on the dimension of the group, 
China becoming a member of WTO, and the major changes in the consumption of ‘table 
art’ products), meant that the manager chosen had to be capable of dealing quickly and 
efficiently with this transition. 
The person chosen (Mário Pais de Sousa) had built a good reputation for his 
positive performance in a capital intensive company (as reported). Once chosen to 
manage the company, Mário Pais de Sousa tried to replicate and use the same formula 
as that used at Vulcano and which had been a success. H  assiduously restructured the 
group aiming at reducing the number of staff and focusing production in the units with 
the most advanced technology in the sector. The plan foresaw a reduction in costs 
mainly associated with the number of employees, but at the same time increasing the 
group’s productivity.  
This strategy proved to be disastrous at a time when t  productive capacity of 
the market was diminishing and China entered the world market with prices which 
could not be competed against, and resulted in VAA losing its competitive advantage 
(the excellence of its products).  
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The fact that Mário Pais de Sousa was an inexperienced manager in the field, 
turned out to be a severe handicap to his leadership of the group. In 2001, had the 
choice of leader of the new group fallen on someone with more experience in the sector, 
s/he could have better interpreted the signs of the market and would have been much 
more opposed to the investments made to provide the group with a greater productive 
capacity, and would have anticipated that even with these investments the company 
would have been unable to compete with the prices of its peers, especially those of the 
Chinese producers. He would also have understood the negative impact that previous 
investments had had on the main characteristics/advantages of the Vista Alegre products 
(excellence and exclusivity), as the growth in production would mean a loss in the 
superb quality of its products, but above all an accentuated decrease in each item’s 
exclusivity. With a career in companies with strong capital (which was not a 
characteristic of VAA) and regardless of his qualities, Mário Pais de Sousa proved to 
have little know-how regarding this field, being incapable of exploiting the competitive 
advantages of the group.  
 
Did the financial restructuring in 2006 generate the desired results? How 
did VAA’s financial health change following this operation?  
The aim of the financial restructuring in 2006 was to solve the group’s 
immediate liquidity problems and also to balance the institution financially by providing 
it with the capital needed to make it operational again.  
With this financial restructuring, VAA’s shareholding structure changed 
substantially (as shown on page 7). Faced with this serious structural imbalance, the 
group’s management reached an agreement with its main creditors – banks BPI, CGD 
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and BCP to convert their credits into group stakes. Through this operation, these 
institutions would now have a dominant position, holding 60% of the group (20% 
respectively for each bank). 
This agreement only met half of its objectives solving the group’s immediate 
problems of liquidity by changing its Current Ratio fr m 0.7 in 2005 to 1.5 in 2006; that 
is, its short-term assets became higher than its short-term liabilities, which made it 
possible to pay their more immediate obligations. With regard to the institution’s 
excessive financial leverage, this restructuring was inefficient in altering the company’s 
negative scenario. In fact, by analysing the D bt to Equity Ratio, we can see that the 
values remained rather worrying after 2006, making it practically impossible to get 
funds from banks which would be essential to economically restructure VAA.  
So, this agreement was no more than a financial anagesic which made it 
possible to solve the group’s serious immediate liquidity problem, not providing it with 
the necessary capital to reconvert its business. In other words, this agreement allowed 
the company to gain some time in the search for an alternative financing means, not 
being a source of funds in itself. 
 
Following the financial restructuring of the group, are the new influential 
shareholders ideal to operate the necessary economic restructure? 
This matter is of great significance once we understand that the restructuring 
which took place in 2006 did not provide VAA with te capital needed for the economic 
restructuring of the group and, therefore, it was crucial to find an alternative method of 
financing given that, at this point, the restructuring that had been put into practice was 
ineffectual.  
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The 2006 restructuring significantly altered VAA's shareholding structure, and it 
was now clearly dominated by the creditor banks (BPI, CGD and BCP) which now held 
60% of the group via the reconversion of their credits in Equity. These new influential 
shareholders did not invest in VAA’s capital because they believed in the company’s 
future, but rather because they believed that this would be the best option to safeguard 
their interests as debtholders (since that before the said restructuring, the group was 
close to being unable to honour its commitments with the aforementioned banking 
institutions). Despite being the new dominant bloc of shareholders, BPI, CGD and BCP 
were not willing to increase their financing of VAA, remaining as the company's 
debtholders, even though now belonging to the sharehold r structure of the group.  
  Thus, this operation had contradictory effects. On the one hand, it was 
responsible for solving immediate problems regarding the group’s liquidity, allowing 
VAA to gain time in the search for a solution for the group. On the other hand, the fact 
that the new shareholders were not willing to finance the company once more was a 
negative aspect of the operation at a time when it was imperative for VAA shareholders 
to believe in the project and be ready to inject funds into the group.    
 
In your opinion, what was the key point that led to VAA's present 
situation? What should have been done? 
 The key event to VAA’s present situation took place in 2001 when the group 
merged with Atlantis, significantly increasing the size of the group at a time when the 
market was drastically changing.   
 This growth at a time when the market was contracting would prove to be a blow 
to the strategy defined by VAA’s administration. Obviously, it is only possible to 
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calculate the evolution of real consumption for any product by analysing past phases. 
Therefore, VAA would not be able to estimate exactly what would happen to the 
consumption of its products whilst programming the op ration with VAA. However, the 
market was already showing signs of shrinkage as from the end of the 80s and there 
were indications that China would soon adhere to WTO - these were critical points to 
the aforementioned merger. At the same time, in general, its European peers were taking 
a chance by reducing their size, focusing on market niches. The exception was 
Waterford Wedgwood which was in fact confronting serious financial problems. Thus, 
as already mentioned above, although it was impossible to foresee the real consumer 
evolution (especially if we take into account that consumer choices changed greatly 
following the events on 11th September, 2001), there were clear signs that a growth 
strategy was inadvisable (especially with China becoming a member of WTO).    
Taking into consideration the conjuncture at the time, a strategy was needed that 
was in line with that taken by the majority of European peers in the field, reduction of 
size, and focusing on market niches that continued to favour exclusivity and high 
quality in tableware products. These were markets where standard inferior quality 
products from China would not be able to penetrate.       
 
What was the government’s role in the takeover bid launched by Visabeira? 
Would it be plausible to believe that this proposal would be put forward without 
government support?  
The Portuguese government was not pleased with the disappearance of this 
centuries’ old Portuguese porcelain brand, especially considering that this brand enjoys 
extraordinary internal prestige, as well as being oe f the few national brands with 
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some external recognition regarding high quality products. Furthermore, Vista Alegre 
Atlantis’s fall would directly result in thousands of unemployed which, considering the 
pessimistic climate in Portuguese society at the end of 2008, and being one of the few 
noteworthy national brands, would aggravate more so this lack of confidence in the 
future of the national economy. Nevertheless, the government's direct intervention in 
VAA would cause various problems. I would like to highlight two of these. The first is 
that, should such intervention take place, it would save at least some of VAA’s work 
posts and the government would be subject to great pressure from other workers in a 
similar situation so that the government would also ‘save’ their companies. Obviously it 
would be unthinkable for the government to give such aid, but it would also be very 
complicated to justify the criterion to save or not t  save each company. The second 
point justifying the direct non-intervention of the government is (as we have seen) the 
need for a profound restructuring of the group, which would necessarily mean that a 
large number of workers would be dismissed. Should this restructuring be carried out by 
the government, it would cause great unpopularity, which no government would be 
willing to face. 
 And so, following the same logic as the operation carried out by Fábrica Bordalo 
Pinheiro, the government intervened indirectly in the purchase of VAA by Visabeira, 
ensuring that financing was possible via government co trolled institutions (CGD and 
Aicep). 
 It is not plausible that this operation could have b en carried out without 
government aid to Visabeira as VAA is a cash-flow consumer group, due mainly to its 
thousand-odd employees, and its viability will only be possible with a profound and 
expensive restructuring given VAA's present state. So, without government financial 
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support, Visabeira would not be able to go ahead with this operation without seriously 
compromising its financial solvency.         
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